Election in Gabon (Update)

Election Monitor

Posted by Maja Bovcon on March 04, 2025 · 4 mins read

When:

The presidential election initially slated for August 2025 was pushed forward to 12 April 2025. The election will mark the return to civilian rule, which was interrupted by the August 2023 military coup.

Main contenders:

Interim president and coup leader General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema is expected to win the election. The vote has likely been pushed forward to legitimize his rule before the honeymoon period ends, as economic challenges and recurrent power cuts intensify. Gabonese widely welcomed the seizure of power by the military junta, which refers to the coup as the “liberation of Gabon”. The Gabonese people were weary of the 55-year rule of the authoritarian and corrupt Bongo dynasty, led by Omar Bongo (1967-2009) and his son Ali Bongo (2009- 2023).

The electoral competition is substantially restricted because:

  • Members of the transitional government as well as presidents of both houses of parliament are not allowed to run. These include some key opposition members from Ali Bongo's era, such as PM Raymond Ndong Sima and President of the Senate Paulette Missambo, former members of the opposition coalition Alternance 2023. By contrast, the transitional Charter and subsequently the new constitution has not imposed any such restrictions on President Oligui Nguema.
  • The legitimacy of former Ali Bongo’s allies and members of the former ruling Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) party suffers from their collaboration with the Bongo dynasty. This includes PDG heavyweight and President of the National Assembly Jean-François Ndongou.
  • The candidate of the opposition coalition Alternance 2023 Albert Ondo Ossa, who has insisted on winning the 2023 presidential election and refused to collaborate with the military junta, has become increasingly isolated.
  • The military-led government has transferred election supervision from an independent electoral commission to the Ministry of Interior. Additionally, all nine members of the Constitutional Court were appointed by Oligui Nguema. As a result, election oversight is now controlled by Oligui Nguema’s appointees and loyalists.

Implications for foreign businesses:

On the positive side:

  • Oligui Nguema’s election victory would ensure the continuation of a generally friendly government’s stance towards foreign businesses. The legitimization of his presidency is likely to boost investor confidence and improve Gabon’s access to external financing.

On the negative side:

  • The new constitution, adopted via referendum in November 2024, extends the presidential term from five to seven years and further consolidates power in the presidency. As a result, all major investment decisions will require presidential approval. While this could streamline project approvals, it also increases the influence of investors’ personal relationships with the president on business decisions. The concentration of power, coupled with a lack of checks and balances, heightens the risk of unpredictable decision-making and favoritism.
  • Amid a worsening economic crisis and high unemployment, sovereign and resource nationalism risks are likely to intensify under the new administration. Oligui Nguema and his military-led government have pledged to strengthen economic sovereignty – particularly in the energy sector – to drive national development and improve living standards of ordinary Gabonese. If economic conditions continue to deteriorate, this push for “Gabonization” of the economy is likely to become more aggressive and populist. This will likely translate into growing pressure from the government and labor unions for foreign firms to prioritize hiring and training local workers. Tensions over employment of expatriate workers in the extractive sector have already sparked conflicts between local employees and foreign companies. In June 2024, the government approved at the Council of Minister a decree fixing a maximum quota for foreign workers at 30%, with limits of 5% for operational staff, 10% for senior technicians and supervisors, and 15% for executives. These quotas can be adjusted at the sectoral level.
  • The country’s fiscal crisis increases the risk of the government failing to meet its financial obligations to foreign creditors and project partners.